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1 Summary
This note describes how to collect charges for ad impact on user experience. The charge may be
per-view, to account for impact on user experience from viewing an ad, or per-click, to account
for impact from clicking on the ad. The results for per-click charges also apply to per-conversion
charges or per-action charges. Conceivably, a marketplace could assess both kinds of charges.
Different advertisersmay use different price types. CPM advertisers agree to pay for each view. CPC
advertisers agree to pay only in case of a click. The paper “Ad Auction Design and User Experience”
(Abrams and Schwarz, 2007) explains how to collect per-click charges from CPC advertisers. This
brief note explains how to extend their result to collect per-view charges from CPC advertisers and
per-view and per-click charges from CPM advertisers.
The main purpose of this note is to extend the Abrams and Schwarz work for the search advertising
marketplace to the display advertising marketplace. In search advertising, the pricing is generally
CPC, and the main impact on user experience results from clicking on an ad. Display advertising
has a diversity of price types, including CPM, CPC, and CPA. Also, in display advertising, simply
viewing an ad can have a strong impact on user experience.
2 Collecting Per-View Charges for CPC Ads
Let v be the per-view charge for impact on user experience for an ad. Let b be the advertiser’s
per-click bid. Let p be the click probability for the ad in the position being auctioned. Then:
• Enter value a = bp−v into the auction for the ad. (Enter a as the per-view bid. Equivalently,
enter a/p as the per-click bid and p as the click probability.)
• If the ad wins and receives a click, charge r + v
p
, where r is the auction price of the click.
(In a first-price auction, r = a/p. In a second-price auction, r ≤ a/p.)
Note that the full click charge r + v
p
is at most b.
3 Collecting Per-View Charges for CPM Ads
As in the previous section, let v be the per-view charge. Let b be the per-view bid. Then:
• Enter value a = b− v into the auction for the ad. (Enter a as the per-view bid.)
• If the ad wins, charge r+v, where r is the auction price of the view. (In a first-price auction,
r = a. In a second-price auction, r ≤ a.)
Note
4 Collecting Per-Click Charges for CPM Ads
Let c be the per-click charge for ad impact on user experience. Let b be the per-view bid. Let p be
the click probability for the ad in the position being auctioned. Then:
• Enter value a = b− cp into the auction for the ad.
• If the ad wins, charge r + cp, where r is the auction price of the view.
5 Collecting Per-View and Per-Click Charges for CPC Ads
Let v be the per-view charge and c be the per-click charge. Let b be the per-click bid and p be the
click probability.
• Enter value a = (b− c)p− v into the auction as the per-view bid for the ad. (Equivalently,
enter a/p as the per-click bid and enter p as the click probability.)
• If the ad wins and receives a click, charge r + c+ v
p
.
6 Combining Per-View and Per-Click Charges for CPM Ads
Let v be the per-view charge and c be the per-click charge. Let b be the per-view bid.
• Enter value a = b− v − cp as the per-view bid.
• If the ad wins, charge r + v + cp.
7 The General Method
This section outlines a general method to charge for impact on user experience in auctions. The
previous results in this note are special cases of this general method. In addition to the price types
discussed previously, this general method also applies to hybrid price types, where an advertiser
offers to pay for multiple outcomes or events. (For example, an advertiser may offer some money to
show their ad and an additional amount if the ad is clicked.)
For a set of events that may follow from selecting an ad, let variable ei be one if event i occurs and
zero if not. Examples of events include displaying the ad, a click on the ad, a conversion, etc. Let bi
be the bid amount the advertiser is willing to pay if event i occurs. Then the advertiser is willing to
pay a total of: ∑
i
biei.
Let pi be the probability of event i. (For the event that the ad is displayed, pi = 1.) The advertiser’s
offer has expected value ∑
i
bipi.
Let ci be the charge for impact on user experience when event i occurs. Then a straightforward
method to apply the charges is:
• For each i, enter ai = bi − ci as the per-event i bid in the auction.
• If the ad wins, then charge
∑
i(ri+ci)ei, where ri is the auction-determined price for event
i.
Then the expected payment is ∑
i
(ri + ci)pi.
This method adjusts each per-event bid to account for the charge for that event. But in many cases
the advertiser is only willing to pay for some events, and the marketplace needs to charge for the
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impact on user experience caused by other events. In these cases, it is possible to achieve the same
expected value for the advertiser’s adjusted offer in the auction and the same expected payment if
the advertiser wins by shifting some charges among events.
Let d1, d2, . . . be any charges such that
∑
i
dipi =
∑
i
cipi.
Then use the method:
• For each i, enter ai = bi − di as the per-event i bid in the auction.
• If the ad wins, charge
∑
i
(ri + di)ei, where ri is the auction-determined price for event i.
The offer adjusted by d1, d2, . . . has the same expected value as the offer adjusted by c1, c2, . . ..
Also, if the prices ri are the same under both adjustments, then
∑
i
(ri + di)pi = (ri + ci)pi.
So there is the same expected payment if the advertiser wins.
If we want all per-event bids in the auction to be nonnegative, then we can impose the constraint on
shifted charges:
∀i : di ≤ bi.
This constraint can be satisfied unless the expected impact on user experience for showing the ad is
greater than the expected value of the advertiser’s offer, in which case the ad should not be shown at
al, so its offer should not be entered into the auction.
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